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Abstract
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, the Australian
government intervened in its own banking system, both to support domestic depositors and
to keep its banking system competitive with those in countries whose regulators had already
intervened. On October 12, 2008, the Australian government announced the Financial Claims
Scheme (FCS) to insure bank depositors. The deposit guarantee automatically insured
depositors at all authorized deposit-taking institutions and covered a range of deposit
accounts. As initially announced, the FCS would provide a blanket guarantee to all depositors
with no fee for participation. This blanket guarantee, however, prompted a migration of
funds from managed funds and investment banks to deposit accounts. On October 24, 2008,
the government formally announced that an unlimited deposit guarantee would remain
available, but in two parts. The FCS would guarantee up to AUD 1 million (about USD
660,000) per person per authorized deposit-taking institution, free of charge. A separate
program would guarantee larger deposits for a fee on a voluntary basis. Prior to the FCS,
Australia did not have a deposit-insurance scheme. The Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA) ran the program. The FCS covered deposits totaling AUD 650 billion in
March 2009. During its crisis operations, no depositor claims were made on the FCS. The
government originally said it would review the cap after three years. In December 2010, the
Australian government said the FCS would be a permanent feature of the Australian financial
system. In February 2012, it lowered the guarantee to AUD 250,000.
Keywords: account guarantee, Australia, ex-post deposit insurance, Financial Claims
Scheme, Global Financial Crisis

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering account guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers
on September 15, 2008, financial
uncertainty spread around the globe,
leading to nervousness among some
Australian depositors (RBA and APRA
2009). Although Australian banks had
relatively little exposure to US assets,
economic growth declined, unemployment
rose, and uncertainty grew (RBA n.d.). In
light of these factors, lending rates
increased and there was increased
competition for deposits (RBA and APRA
2009). On October 10, 2008, the Group of
Seven, with the hope of bolstering
depositor confidence, agreed that deposit
guarantees around the world should be
consistent (G-7 2008). The widespread
panic prompted the Australian government
to intervene in its banking system, both to
support its domestic depositors and to
maintain its international competitiveness
(Australian Government 2012b; Rudd
2008). On October 12, 2008, the Australian
government announced the Financial
Claims Scheme (FCS). The FCS aimed to
reassure depositors that they could access
their funds quickly in the event of a bank’s
failure, and to ensure that Australian banks
remained internationally competitive
(Swan 2008b).
The FCS automatically insured all
authorized deposit-taking institutions
(ADIs), including Australian-owned banks,
Australian subsidiaries of foreign-owned
banks, building societies, and credit unions
(Prime Minister of Australia 2008). As
initially announced, the guarantee was a
blanket guarantee, with unlimited coverage
and no fee for participation. This blanket
guarantee

Key Terms
Purpose: To “give depositors in an authorised
deposit-taking institution or ADI, as the legislation
describes it, prompt access to funds in the unlikely
event that such a financial institution should fail”
and to match deposit guarantees in other countries
(Prime Minister of Australia 2008; Swan 2008b)
Launch Dates

Announcement: Oct. 12, 2008
Authorization: Oct. 17, 2008
Operation: Nov. 28, 2008

End Dates

Originally scheduled to be
reviewed by Oct. 12, 2011. In
2010, revised and made
permanent

Eligible
Institutions

Authorized deposit-taking
institutions (ADIs)

Eligible Account(s)

Deposit accounts held within
ADIs

Fees

No fees were associated with
the program, but the
Australian government could
impose industry-wide fees in
the case of an ADI failure

Size of Guarantee

Originally, unlimited. Then,
AUD 1 million

Coverage

AUD 650 billion in March 2009

Outcomes

No depositor claims made

Notable Features

Participation in the unlimited
guarantee was voluntary
The FCS had a complicated
exercise process, which
required the APRA to get
approval from the Treasurer
and courts
(continued)
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resulted in market distortions, as market
participants moved funds from managed
funds and investment banks to deposit
accounts (Swan 2008a; Bendeich 2008).

Notable Features

Although the FCS was
subject to an AUD 1
million cap, another
program was available
to guarantee larger
deposits for a fee

On October 24, 2008, the government
formally announced that the FCS would
The FCS charged no
fees, though the
guarantee AUD 1 million per person (about
Australian government
USD 660,000) per ADI, free of charge, and
could impose industrycover a range of deposits.3 The purpose of
wide fees to cover any
this change was to limit market distortions
losses
associated with the guarantee (Swan 2008a).
The FCS also had a
For deposits over AUD 1 million, depositors
program that insured
could be covered on a voluntary basis under
claims by general
the Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits
insurance policyholders
and Wholesale Funding (GS), which charged
fees for the guarantee (Prime Minister of
Australia 2008; Australian Treasury 2008c; Smith 2020). Prior to the FCS, Australia did not
have a deposit-insurance scheme (Kerlin 2017, 291).
During the first three years of its operations, the government said it would appropriate an
unlimited amount of funds to meet depositors’ entitlements if the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority (APRA) had assumed control of their bank in a receivership. After that,
a maximum budgetary appropriation of AUD 20 billion could be used to fulfill claims. The
Australian government recognized that this AUD 20 billion fund would not cover the
potential failure of its largest banks (FSB 2011). ADIs did not have to pay fees to receive
coverage of the first AUD 1 million of a depositor’s entitlements under the FCS (Australian
Treasury 2008c). To fund any FCS costs in excess of budgetary appropriation, disbursements
were expected to be recovered through liquidation in receivership and through industrywide fees imposed after an ADI’s failure.
The Australian government passed legislation empowering the APRA, the Australian bank
regulator, to administer timely depositor payouts through the FCS; prior to the legislation,
the APRA could only compensate depositors of a failed ADI after it had undergone
liquidation—a potentially lengthy process (FCS Bill 2008a; APRA 2009).
The FCS covered deposits totaling AUD 650 billion in March 2009 (Australian Treasury
2008c; RBA and APRA 2009). During its crisis operations, no depositor claims were made on
the FCS (APRA n.d.).
Originally, the FCS had no end date; the FCS’s guarantee cap was scheduled to be reexamined
by October 12, 2011 (Prime Minister of Australia 2008). In December 2010, the Australian
government decided to make the FCS a permanent feature of the Australian financial system
(Australian Treasury 2010a). Until February 1, 2012, the FCS guaranteed AUD 1 million per
3

On October 23, 2008, USD 1 = AUD 1.49, per Yahoo Finance.
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person per ADI, free of charge. Afterward, the government lowered the guarantee to AUD
250,000 per person per ADI. A grandfathering provision also extended higher coverage for
term deposits that existed on September 10, 2011 (Australian Government 2012b).
Following its revision, the FCS continued to cover “99 per cent of deposit accounts in full, and
about 50 per cent of eligible deposits by value” (Australian Treasury 2011; Turner 2011).
Furthermore, the GS closed for new liabilities at the end of March 2010 and guaranteed
liabilities until October 2015 (Australian Government 2012a).
Summary Evaluation
The FCS was implemented to reassure depositors and ensure that Australian banks were not
disadvantaged compared to their international counterparts (Prime Minister of Australia
2008; Swan 2008b). The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and APRA said that after the
announcement of the FCS there was a “sharp increase” in deposit accounts at banks, which
households perceived as relatively safer for their savings than investments in real estate or
the stock market (RBA and APRA 2009). They also said that “there was a reversal in
potentially destabilising deposit outflows from a number of ADIs that had been evident in
early October.” Between October 12, 2008, and July 24, 2009, Australian banks of all sizes
gained market share of deposits, with smaller and regional banks growing faster than the
country’s four largest banks; depositors migrated to domestically owned banks from
subsidiaries and branches of foreign-owned banks. The FCS, as originally announced on
October 12, 2008, was also associated with market distortions, as market participants moved
their funds to fully guaranteed deposit accounts (Bendeich 2008; Swan 2008a). Ultimately,
this prompted the Australian government to limit the FCS’s free deposit coverage to AUD 1
million (Swan 2008a; Australian Treasury 2008c). The RBA, APRA, and others also found
that credit unions and building societies lost market share of deposits in the months leading
up to September 2008, but the announcement of the FCS stabilized those losses.
No banks made claims on the FCS, and the Australian economy emerged “relatively well”
from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (IMF 2012; Schwartz and Tan 2016). An insurance
company, though, did make use of the FCS (Australian Treasury 2009; APRA n.d.). Scholars
attributed the FCS’s relative success to the APRA’s prudential authority, which eliminated
the need for an additional administrative body and avoided potential coordination problems
(Turner 2011).
Despite its success, the FCS also faced several criticisms about its ex-post funding
arrangement (IMF 2012). During the first three years of its operations, an unlimited amount
of funds could be appropriated to meet depositor entitlements if their bank failed (FCS Bill
2008a). Following the first three years of the FCS’s operation, a maximum of AUD 20 billion
could be used to fulfill claims (FCS Bill 2008a; APRA 2009). No fees were levied against ADIs
covered by the FCS, though deposits in excess of the AUD 1 million cap could be guaranteed
for a fee (Australian Treasury 2008c). Rather, FCS disbursements were expected to be
recovered through receivership liquidation and through industry-wide fees that could be
imposed after an ADI’s failure.
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In a review shortly after the government made the FCS permanent, the IMF noted several
aspects of the ex-post funding arrangement that were below industry standards (IMF 2012).
First, the delayed funding could lead to delays in deposit repayment, which could reduce
depositor confidence. A potential delay in repayment could be worsened by the limited forms
of deposit repayments available under the FCS: “checks drawn on RBA, electronic transfers
to accounts at another ADI, or other similar cash payments.” Second, the funding
arrangement might contribute to moral-hazard concerns because ADIs might be inclined to
take increased risks if they benefitted from the FCS’s protection without paying fees.
The IMF also expressed concern about the potential unpredictability of the FCS’s execution
procedure. After the APRA had applied to the Australian federal court, the FCS’s guarantee
would be activated at the Australian Treasurer’s discretion (FCS Act 2008; Turner 2011).
This wind-up process could lead to uncertainty about whether the courts would approve the
APRA’s request and whether the Treasurer would activate the FCS; if either process failed, it
could hurt depositor confidence and lead to bank runs.
To help Australian authorities improve the FCS, the IMF recommended that they reevaluate
the merits of an ex-ante funding scheme and create a more straightforward wind-up process.
The IMF reiterated this recommendation in 2019. Australian officials, however, did not
support the IMF’s recommendation (IMF MCMD 2019).
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Context: Australia 2008–2011
$1.1 trillion in 2008
$1.0 trillion in 2009
$1.3 trillion in 2010
$1.5 trillion in 2011
$49,602 in 2008
$42,772 in 2009
$52,022 in 2010
$62,518 in 2011
Data for 2008–2010:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Government ownership of banking system

Data for 2011:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAAu
Fitch: AAA
$1.2 trillion in 2008
$1.3 trillion in 2009
$1.5 trillion in 2010
$1.8 trillion in 2011
116.6% in 2008
125.2% in 2009
123.4% in 2010
121.1% in 2011
90.6% in 2008
92.1% in 2009
93.3% in 2010
93.8% in 2011
85.9% in 2008
89.1% in 2009
89.6% in 2010
90.2% in 2011
5% in 2008
3% in 2009
3% in 2010
2% in 2011
Data not available for 2008–2011

Existence of deposit insurance

Yes, in 2008–2011

Size of banking system

Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system

Five-bank concentration of banking system

Foreign involvement in banking system

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Financial Claims Scheme was intended to bolster depositor
confidence while maintaining international competitiveness.
By June 2008, the Australian government had begun work on the Financial Claims Scheme
(FCS), which was meant to protect depositors’ funds (Swan 2008b; Australian Treasury
2008b; Australian Treasury 2008a). By September 2008, the RBA reported that the
government intended to guarantee AUD 20,000 and expected to pass the requisite legislation
by year-end 2008 (RBA 2008b). The RBA attributed the delay between the announcement
and the government’s expected action to the investigation of technical issues associated with
the scheme (RBA 2008a).
On October 10, 2008, the Group of Seven urged countries to maintain robust and consistent
deposit-insurance systems (G-7 2008). On October 12, 2008, amidst the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC), the Australian government officially announced the FCS. The scheme was
conceived as a response to actions taken by international competitors (Rudd 2008; Prime
Minister of Australia 2008). As initially announced, the FCS provided a blanket guarantee to
all depositors with no fee for participation. The government also announced on that day a
guarantee scheme for banks’ non-deposit wholesale term funding.
2. Part of a Package: The FCS was accompanied by the Australian Government
Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding and a program to
purchase residential mortgage-backed securities.
Originally, the government announced that it would provide a blanket guarantee to all
depositors with no fee for participation. However, this announcement led to market
distortions, as market participants moved their funds into guaranteed deposit accounts
(Swan 2008a; Bendeich 2008). On October 22, 2008, Treasurer Wayne Swan said that, due
to these market distortions, the Australian government had considered whether to cap the
FCS’s free depositor protection.
On October 24, 2008, the government announced that an unlimited deposit guarantee would
remain available, but in two parts. The FCS would guarantee AUD 1 million per person per
authorized deposit-taking institution (ADI), free of charge (Australian Treasury 2008c). For
deposits over AUD 1 million, depositors could be covered under the Guarantee Scheme for
Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding (GS), which charged fees for the guarantee (Smith
2020). Both programs were meant to reassure depositors that they would have access to
their funds if their banks failed. The government also expressed the intention to compete
with countries that had announced similar guarantee programs (Australian Government
2012b).
Also, on October 12, 2008, the government announced the purchase of residential mortgagebacked securities to “benefit Australia’s mortgage market and ensure that this sector of the
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lending market [had] access to funding for its operations” (Prime Minister of Australia 2008).
These purchases lasted until April 2013 and totaled AUD 20 billion (Reuters 2013).
In addition to guaranteeing deposits, the FCS insured general insurance policyholders
through the Policyholder Compensation Facility (PCF) (APRA 2009). The Treasury had
announced the PCF alongside the FCS’s depositor protections in June 2008 (Australian
Treasury 2008b; Swan 2008b). The PCF allowed the APRA to appoint judicial managers to
general insurance issuers and to provide policyholders access to funds to meet their
insurance claims if their general insurer were to fail. The APRA said that such a facility was
in the “interests of policyholders and financial system stability in Australia.”
3. Legal Authority: The FCS was established pursuant to the Financial System
Legislation Amendment (Financial Claims Scheme and Other Measures) Act of
2008, allowing regulators to set the deposit-insurance cap. It was later made a
permanent feature of the Australian financial system.
The Australian government passed the Financial System Legislation Amendment (Financial
Claims Scheme and Other Measures) Act of 2008 on October 17, 2008. This act created the
FCS, authorized the APRA to administer it, and allowed regulators to set the depositinsurance cap (FCS Act 2008; Prime Minister of Australia 2008). On November 3, 2008, the
Treasury set the cap at AUD 1 million, with the cap coming into effect on November 28, 2008
(Banking Amendment Regulations 2008a; Banking Amendment Regulations 2008b). The
government proposed the bill on October 15, 2008, and it passed both chambers of
parliament without amendments (FCS Bill 2008b). Australian representatives expressed
concerns with the bill during debate, such as moral-hazard concerns (Australian House of
Representatives 2008).
The Australian government had begun work on the FCS in early 2008 (Swan 2008b;
Australian Treasury 2008a; Australian Treasury 2008b). Treasurer Wayne Swan credited
much of the FCS’s success to this pre-October 2008 work (Swan 2013). The FCS that was
implemented in October 2008, however, differed from that prior plan (Australian Treasury
2010a). For instance, the prior plan would have had an AUD 20,000 insurance cap per
depositor; the crisis-time FCS had a cap of AUD 1 million (Australian Treasury 2008b;
Australian Treasury 2008c; RBA 2008b).
On December 12, 2010, the Australian government said it would make the FCS a permanent
feature of the financial system (Australian Treasury 2010a).
4. Administration: The APRA administered the FCS.
The APRA was responsible for administering the FCS, pursuant to the amendments to the
FCS Act of 2008 that the legislature passed in October 2008 (FCS Act 2008; Prime Minister
of Australia 2008). The APRA was charged with protecting depositors, ensuring financial
safety and efficiency, and promoting financial stability (Council of Financial Regulators
2008). The APRA was also responsible for assessing and advising ADIs while coordinating
and communicating with ADIs in financial distress. Policymakers saw the APRA as best
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suited to administer the FCS. As Australia’s prudential bank regulator, it had the information
needed to implement the FCS.
5. Governance: The Council of Financial Regulators also helped coordinate the FCS
and the IMF reviewed the FCS. The FCS was also subject to governmental scrutiny.
The Council of Financial Regulators, a body comprised of the APRA, the RBA, the Australian
Treasury, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, was also consulted to
“coordinate policy actions aimed at ensuring the safety and efficiency of the financial system”
(Turner 2011). The Council was instrumental in advocating for deposit insurance prior to
2008 and was the body that assessed whether the FCS should be modified after the financial
crisis (Turner 2011; Council of Financial Regulators 2009). The Council and the Treasury
also advised the APRA with respect to the FCS’s implementation (APRA 2009; Australian
Treasury 2010b).
The IMF also conducted a report of the FCS and provided several policy recommendations.
See the Evaluation section above for a discussion of the IMF’s report.
The Australian government exercised oversight powers over the FCS, determining the extent
of its coverage and whether it would be made a permanent feature of the Australian banking
system.
6. Communication: The Australian government announced the FCS to reassure
depositors during a time of economic uncertainty and to ensure that Australian
banks were not disadvantaged.
On October 12, 2008, the Australian government announced the FCS (Prime Minister of
Australia 2008). The Australian government noted that the FCS was meant to reassure
depositors in the face of economic uncertainty. Wayne Swan, the Treasurer of Australia,
emphasized that the FCS was meant to protect small depositors and ensure that these
depositors had access to their funds. Swan also stressed that the FCS was not intended to be
a “general deposit insurance scheme” and that the FCS was not meant to shelter large-scale
investors from risk, nor burden the banking system (Swan 2008b). Furthermore, then
general manager of the APRA David Lewis emphasized that the FCS was not a “compensation
scheme,” but rather a means to ensure that depositors could access their funds quickly
(Lewis 2009).
The government framed the FCS, along with the other guarantee program, as a measure to
ensure that Australian banks could compete with their international counterparts, many of
which had benefited from emergency guarantee programs extended by host governments.
Prior to the GFC, in June 2008, the Australian government announced that it had begun work
on the FCS, which was meant to protect depositors’ funds (Swan 2008b; Australian Treasury
2008a; Australian Treasury 2008b). By September 2008, the RBA reported that the
government intended to guarantee AUD 20,000 and expected to pass the requisite legislation
by year-end 2008 (RBA 2008b). The delay in the scheme’s adoption, RBA said, was due to an
investigation of technical issues associated with the scheme (RBA 2008a).
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According to the Council of Financial Regulators’ Memorandum of Understanding, adopted
on September 18, 2008, the APRA was responsible for the communication of its supervisory
actions and for the implementation of the FCS, even though the FCS remained unlegislated.
The APRA also was responsible for communicating with ADIs, in the event of a “coordinated
response” (Council of Financial Regulators 2008). The Treasurer and the Australian
government, though, were responsible for communicating with the public about any
resolutions, including the decision to exercise the FCS.
7. Size of Guarantees: The FCS provided coverage for eligible accounts up to AUD 1
million per depositor; a separate scheme provided voluntary coverage above that
amount.
On October 12, 2008, when the FCS was officially announced, there was “no limit on the
deposits covered” (Prime Minister of Australia 2008). However, due to market distortions
and advice from the Council of Financial Regulators, on October 24, 2008, the government
decided to cap its deposit guarantee at AUD 1 million, with amounts over AUD 1 million
eligible for coverage with a fee (Australian Treasury 2008c; Swan 2008a). Once the FCS
became fully operational on November 28, 2008, the FCS guaranteed AUD 1 million per
person per ADI, free of charge (Australian Treasury 2008c; RBA and APRA 2009). In March
2009, the FCS covered AUD 650 billion (RBA and APRA 2009). At its peak, in January 2010,
the GS covered AUD 166 billion (Schwartz 2010).
On September 11, 2011, the government announced that it would lower the insurance cap
to AUD 250,000 per person per ADI, free of charge, effective February 1, 2012 (Australian
Government 2012b). A grandfathering provision also extended the AUD 1 million coverage
for term deposits that existed on September 10, 2011, until the earlier of the maturity dates
or December 31, 2012, and the new AUD 250,000 cap applied thereafter.
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The FCS was funded through a standing fund,
backed by taxpayers; starting in 2012 the government introduced an ex-post
system, under which industry-wide fees would be imposed after the failure of a
participating institution.
During its first three years of operation, the FCS was backed directly by taxpayers: The
legislature would appropriate any amount of funds needed to meet depositor entitlements if
their bank failed (FCS Bill 2008a). These taxpayer funds would come from the Consolidated
Revenue Fund (APRA 2009). After its first three years, the legislation set a limit of AUD 20
billion on the amount the legislature could appropriate to fulfill depositor claims for a single
failed bank. The APRA could also borrow, so long as the borrowed assets were channeled
into the FCS Special Account.
When exercising the guarantee, the APRA would first draw upon the standing appropriation
from the FCS Special Account (APRA 2009). Then, if necessary, the APRA could claim on the
institution during its liquidation. If these funds were insufficient, then the APRA would apply
an industry-wide fee to cover any shortfalls.
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The IMF noted that this ex-post funding scheme could lead to delays in deposit repayment,
which could reduce depositor confidence, and that the ex-post fees might contribute to
moral-hazard concerns (IMF 2012).
9. Eligible Institutions: All Australian ADIs were automatically enrolled in the FCS.
All ADIs, including Australian-owned banks, Australian subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks,
building societies, and credit unions, were automatically enrolled in the FCS (Prime Minister
of Australia 2008). The Treasury noted that deposit funding was critical for Australia’s small
banks, credit unions, and building societies (Australian Treasury 2010a). In light of this
importance, the Treasury asserted that without the FCS these institutions would have “had
very substantial problems.”
The Australian Treasurer in October 2008 announced that foreign-bank branches would be
able to access the guarantee of term wholesale funding and large deposits under the GS;
however, they would not be eligible for the free guarantee of deposits below the AUD 1
million threshold under the FCS (Australian Treasury 2008c). The RBA in March 2009 noted
that “deposits with foreign bank branches are not guaranteed under the Financial Claims
Scheme” (RBA 2009). Foreign-bank branches were not eligible for depositor protections
(FCS Act 2008).
10. Eligible Accounts: The FCS covered all deposit accounts with balances under AUD
1 million.
The FCS covered all deposit accounts held in ADIs (RBA and APRA 2009).
The FCS guaranteed AUD 1 million per person per ADI, free of charge. For deposits over AUD
1 million, depositors could be covered under the GS, which charged fees for the guarantee
(Australian Treasury 2008c; Smith 2020).
Prior to becoming a permanent fixture of Australia’s financial system, the FCS underwent
important changes via prudential standards (APRA 2011). For instance, the APRA required
ADIs to identify individual accountholders more carefully in order to make it easier to
confirm depositors’ claims in a liquidation.
11. Fees: There were no up-front fees associated with the FCS, but the legislation gave
the government the authority to impose an industry-wide levy to cover any losses
on the liquidation of a failed bank.
As an ex-post deposit guarantee, there were no fees for deposits within APRA’s maximum
coverage limits (Turner 2011). A separate, voluntary insurance program for deposits over
AUD 1 million did charge a fee (Australian Treasury 2008c). These fees were charged
according to an institution’s credit rating, with the lowest fees set at 70 basis points per
annum on covered deposits for AA-rated institutions (Schwartz 2010). A-rated institutions
paid 100 basis points per annum on covered deposits, while BBB-rated and unrated
institutions paid 150 basis points.
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The Australian government also had the ability to impose industry-wide fees in the event
that payments to deposits exceeded liquidation recoveries on the failure of an ADI (APRA
2009). In the case of an ex-post fee, the levy amount could not exceed 0.5% of an ADI’s
liabilities to its depositors (ADI Levy Act 2008a; ADI Levy Act 2008b).
12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: To activate the FCS, the APRA was required to
get approval from Australia’s Treasurer and from the courts. This would activate
the Early Access Facility for Depositors. A standing fund would then cover
depositors. The APRA would subsequently liquidate the institution’s remaining
assets to cover claims. The Australian government could then impose a levy to
cover any additional shortfall.
In order to activate the FCS, the APRA was required to receive approval from the Australian
courts that an ADI could be wound up (FCS Act 2008). In addition to the court’s approval, the
Australian Treasurer was required to approve the FCS’s activation. This would activate the
Early Access Facility for Depositors (FCS Bill 2008a). Once the FCS was activated, the APRA
would assume control of the ADI.
Afterward, liquidation recoveries would repay the FCS.
13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts: There were no other
conditions associated with the FCS.
The FCS had no additional conditions.4
14. Duration: In 2010, the government said it would make the FCS a permanent
feature of the Australian financial system.
When it officially announced the FCS on October 12, 2008, the Australian government said it
would review the need for a cap on the insurance level by October 12, 2011 (Prime Minister
of Australia 2008). The Australian government in December 2010 said it would make the
FCS a permanent feature of the Australian financial landscape (Turner 2011). Changes were
made to the FCS in light of its permanent extension. After February 1, 2012, the FCS
guaranteed AUD 250,000 per person per ADI, with no associated fee (Australian Government
2012b). The extended FCS also included a grandfathering provision, which extended greater
coverage for certain deposits.
The GS closed for new liabilities at the end of March 2010 and guaranteed liabilities until
October 2015 (Australian Government 2012a).

When the Australian Senate debated the FCS, Senator Bob Brown attempted to limit the salaries of all
executives of guaranteed ADIs. Brown’s motion, though, failed (Australian Parliament 2008).
4
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